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Survey 
JURY NULLIFICATION:  A SELECTIVE, 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Teresa L. Conaway,* Carol L. Mutz,** & Joann M. Ross*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Juries are expected to look at the facts of a case as presented in court, 
weigh them against the law as it has been explained to them by the 
judge, and then pronounce the result:  the defendant is guilty or not 
guilty,  liable or not liable.  Sometimes, however, juries look at the law 
and dislike what they see, at least with respect to the specific set of facts 
before them.  When this happens, juries have been known to reach 
verdicts contrary to what logic dictates, which is known as “jury 
nullification.” 
 
There are any number of reasons why a jury might decide not to 
enforce a specific law against a specific defendant, some of them more 
noble than others.  Depending on one’s perspective, jury nullification is a 
courageous act of civil disobedience or the reprehensible act of an out-of-
control jury.  It ensures liberty or results in anarchy; it should be left 
unfettered or needs to be controlled.   
 
The debate over jury nullification is multi-faceted.  Indeed, many 
authors even disagree over the proper definition of jury nullification.  
Some approve of jury nullification in principle but do not believe juries 
should be informed of their ability to defy the law as explained to them 
by the judge.  Others believe juries should be told outright of this ability.  
Still others decry the principle and seek ways to prevent jury 
nullification from ever happening.  Others encourage its use, especially 
in certain types of cases. 
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The purpose of this bibliography is to collect and summarize the 
scholarly writing to date on this controversial subject.  It is selective in 
the sense that it excludes the copious body of newspaper and popular 
magazine articles on the subject.  It also excludes most articles or books 
in which jury nullification is merely one small part of the overall 
discussion.  The case law section attempts to include a representative 
case from each state and federal circuit rather than all cases on the 
subject.  We hope that this approach will provide a launching point for 
further research in most jurisdictions. 
 
The bibliography is organized into secondary sources and primary 
sources, respectively.  The former includes articles and monographs.  
Articles are organized into the ten following categories:  (1) General; (2) 
Offers Solutions; (3) Gender, Race, & Jury Nullification; (4) Jury 
Nullification in Political & Policy-making Contexts; (5) Death Penalty; (6) 
United States v. Thomas; (7) Civil Jury Nullification; (8) State-Specific; (9) 
The Fully Informed Jury Association; and (10) Dissertations, Theses, & 
Jury Studies.  The primary sources include cases and constitutional 
provisions. 
 
II.  SECONDARY SOURCES 
 




Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 
125 (1998):   
In this article, Abramson analyzes the following two competing 
theories of jury deliberation:  impartialism (emphasis on individual 
impartiality) and pluralism (overall impartiality achieved by a cross-
representation of the community).  Impartialists oppose jury nullification 
as an anarchy of conscience.  Pluralists are wary of jury nullification.  
Though they like the power the doctrine gives to juries to reflect 
community norms and values, they also fear this power can be 
discriminatory or undemocratic.  Abramson also discusses whether there 
is any way to get the good of jury nullification without the bad.  Lastly, 
he discusses Prof. Paul Butler’s proposal that black jurors use the power 
of jury nullification in a race conscious manner to acquit black 
defendants charged with non-violent drug possession offenses. 
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Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury:  Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 386 (1954):   
Broeder examines the following three duties of the jury:  (1) to 
declare the law in opposition to what the judge says the law is; (2) to 
decide whether a given type of conduct or group event falls within the 
legal rule as laid down by the court; and (3) to inject an element of 
community sentiment into its resolution of issues upon which reasonable 
men may differ. 
 
W. Neil Brooks & Anthony N. Doob, Justice & the Jury, 31 J. Soc. Sci. 
171 (1975): 
In Justice & the Jury, the authors consider the kinds of extra-legal 
factors that appear to influence jury decisions. 
 
Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1149 (1997): 
Brown disputes the prevailing assumption that nullification subverts 
the rule of law.  He believes that three out of the four types of 
nullification cases can be reconciled with the rule of law.  The fourth 
type—bias, such as racism—does not uphold the rule of law. 
 
Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 
2381 (1999): 
Clark believes criminal trial juries perform an important, but 
unappreciated, social function:  providing a means through which the 
community takes responsibility for inherently problematic judgments 
regarding the blameworthiness or culpability of fellow citizens.  
Nullification is a risk that we ought to bear. 
 
Clay S. Conrad, Jury Nullification as a Defense Strategy, 2 Tex. F. on C.L. 
& C.R. 1 (1995): 
Clay Conrad argues that defense attorneys should aggressively seek 
nullification in cases where their technically guilty clients are morally 
blameless.  He also says that juries are a source of feedback to the 
legislative process because laws that are regularly nullified should be 
changed.  Lastly, he suggests strategies lawyers can use to get the jury to 
nullify. 
 
Conaway et al.: Jury Nullification:  A Selective, Annotated Bibliography
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
396 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
Judge Lawrence W. Crispo, et al., Jury Nullification:  Law Versus 
Anarchy, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1997): 
In this article, the authors argue that jury nullification threatens the 
integrity of our judicial system, and so suggest ways to protect against 
jury nullification. 
 
Leo P. Dreyer, Comment, Jury Nullification and the Pro Se Defense:  The 
Impact of Dougherty v. United States, 21 U. Kan. L. Rev. 47 (1972): 
This note addresses the interrelationship between the doctrine of 
jury nullification and the right to defend pro se.  In particular, it 
compares and contrasts Judge Bazelton’s dissent in Dougherty with the 
majority’s position. 
 
James Joseph Duane, Jury Nullification:  The Top Secret Constitutional 
Right, Litig., Summer 1996, at 6-14, 59-60: 
This author believes none of the arguments against a jury 
nullification instruction hold up to examination.  He argues that because 
we refuse to be truthful with juries, they will continue making terrible 
choices based on a little knowledge gained from magazines and the 
Internet, and judges will lose their credibility. 
 
David Farnham, Jury Nullification:  History Proves It’s Not a New Idea, 
Crim. Just., Winter 1997, at  4-14: 
In this article, Farnham argues that jury nullification is a power of 
the jury as a whole, not of an individual juror.  When one juror refuses to 
listen to arguments, it is a frustration of justice, not jury nullification.  
Such jurors already sit on juries and do not need instruction.  Failing to 
instruct keeps responsible jurors from exercising their full responsibility 
and does nothing to prevent the idiosyncratic juror from indulging in 
whim and prejudice. 
 
Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment, 28 
Hofstra L. Rev. 669 (2000): 
Finkel contends that because jurors are lay people and are the 
ultimate arbiters of the law, we risk nullification or anarchy if the 
criminal law is not consistent from community sentiment.  Finkel 
summarizes his jury research and shows that lay views can be 
sophisticated, even if at odds with the law.  He concludes that 
Commonsense Justice “reaches for more ingredients than the law” and 
anchors itself by reasonableness. 
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Joseph L. Galiber, et al., Law, Justice, and Jury Nullification:  A Debate, 
29 Crim. L. Bull. 40 (1993): 
This article contains notes from a February 13, 1992, panel discussion 
on jury nullification at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New 
York City.  The panel, made up of a legislator, a prosecutor, a criminal 
defense attorney, and two academics, questioned whether nullification is 
still a useful defense against governmental tyranny or rather, erodes the 
law. 
 
W. Russel Gray, Supralegal Justice:  Are Real Juries Acting Like Fictional 
Detectives?, 21 J. Am. Culture 1 (1998): 
Gray suggests that jury nullification is similar to the vigilante tactics 
of many heroes of American popular fiction and film and claims that the 
heart of the issue is the possibility that true justice may transcend laws.  
He then examines the social context for jury nullification and the literary 
context for the fictional detective’s pursuit of justice. 
 
Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American 
Jury, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 377 (1999): 
In this article, Harrington examines jury nullification in the context 
of the recurring cycle between justice without law and a more formalized 
law-making process.  He sees the jury’s loss of its law-making function 
as an inevitable casualty in the march of time. 
 
W. William Hodes, Lord Broughham, the Dream Team, and Jury 
Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1075 (1996): 
Hodes distinguishes between three different kinds of jury 
nullification, which follow:  (1) jury consideration of the justness of the 
applicable law; (2) juries who have no political or moral objections to the 
applicable law, but who find abuse in the invocation of the law; and (3) 
the jury has no qualms about the law or how it is being applied, but will 
acquit anyway to send a message.  The acquittal of O.J. Simpson was an 
example of the third kind. 
 
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 
582 (1939): 
Howe addresses the judiciary’s response to the demand that the jury 
in criminal cases should judge the law.  Howe, writing in the 1930s, saw 
a reversal by the judiciary, which earlier in our history had accepted the 
jury’s right to decide the law. 
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Major Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification:  Calling for Candor from the 
Bench and Bar, 173 Mil. L. Rev. 68 (2002): 
This article addresses the circumstances under which jury 
nullification may be an issue in a military trial and reviews the history 
and competing policies behind the concept of jury nullification.  It 
advocates allowing military counsel to argue the concept directly to the 
panel to prevent driving the argument “underground,” leading to 
unpredictable administration of justice. 
 
John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 477 
(2002): 
This article considers the following various ways in which common 
law juries might be made more accountable:  (1) hard political 
accountability whereby decision-makers can be removed from their 
position when their actions or decisions are unacceptable; and (2) softer 
accountability measures that demands that decision-making is 
procedurally transparent and that decision-makers are representative or 
reflective of the community they serve.  The article concludes that 
limitations on the way juries can be made accountable in the hard sense 
means that greater emphasis should be given to the ways in which they 
can be made more accountable in the softer sense. 
 
Frank A. Kaufman, The Right of Self-Representation and the Power of 
Jury Nullification, 28 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 269 (1978): 
Kaufman examines the relationship between the criminal 
defendant’s right to self-representation and the jury’s nullification 
power.  In a political trial, the pro se defendant has a unique opportunity 
to seek jury nullification.  Fairness and candor demand that judges 
should be able to instruct the jury on nullification in appropriate cases. 
 
Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Korroch & Major Michael J. 
Davidson, Jury Nullification:  A Call for Justice or an Invitation to Anarchy?, 
139 Mil. L. Rev. 131 (1993): 
This article reviews the history of jury nullification, and concludes 
that neither nullification instructions by judges nor nullification 
arguments by defense counsel should be foreclosed completely, because 
to do so might overshadow the rendition of justice. 
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Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis, Not Jury Nullification; Not a Call for 
Ethical Reform; But Rather, a Case for Judicial Control, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 
1109 (1996): 
Justice Kourlis disputes Professor Hodes’s conclusions by arguing 
that jury nullification is akin to anarchy.  Kourlis also argues that ethical 
standards prohibit a criminal defense attorney from urging a jury to 
disregard the law and that it is the ultimate responsibility of the 
presiding judge to prevent such an argument.  For example, Johnnie 
Cochran flirted with jury nullification in the O.J. Simpson case but less so 
than the press or Professor Hodes have inferred. 
 
Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to 
Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 111 
(1999): 
Krauss examines the doctrinal history of jury nullification in the 
colonial period  concluding that the published records studied prove that 
the jury’s right in any real sense was firmly established in only one 
colony, Rhode Island.  There is some evidence that criminal juries may 
have had some form of lawfinding authority at times in colonial 
Pennsylvania and New York, and a strong indicator that there was no 
such right for much of the colonial era in Georgia, Maryland, and 
Massachusetts. 
 
Stephan Landsman, Of Mushrooms & Nullifiers:  Rules of Evidence and 
the American Jury, 21 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 65 (2002): 
Landsman discusses jury “blindfolding” in the context of the rules of 
evidence and argues that juries must be fully informed. 
 
Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
877 (1999): 
Marder argues that the jury has an interpretive role whenever it 
finds facts or applies a legal standard that is vague or ambiguous, and 
that the jury plays a political role by providing feedback to the 
government.  The conventional view that jury nullification is always 
harmful is a myth; jury nullification provides more benefits than harm. 
 
Richard H. Menard, Jr., Note, Ten Reasonable Men, 38 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 179 (2001): 
Menard argues that the two-way unanimity rule in criminal jury 
trials serves no identifiable public interest.  He proposes that the rule be 
replaced by a one-way ten to two rule:  ten or more votes to convict, with 
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fewer than ten resulting in acquittal.  In this note, Menard also discusses 
the jury’s role as a political institution and as an evidentiary device. 
 
Harris G. Mirkin, Judicial Review, Jury Review & the Right of Revolution 
Against Despotism, 6 Polity 38 (1973): 
Mirkin discusses the judicial and jury powers of revolution by 
nullification in an historical context, which sees jury nullification as the 
populist counterpart to the aristocratic institution of judicial review.  
Mirkin suggests that juries are an alternative to revolution because they 
prevent the enforcement of laws that would give rise to a right of 
revolution. 
 
Aaron T. Oliver, Jury Nullification:  Should the Type of Case Matter?, 6 
Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y, Winter 1997, at 49: 
Oliver believes nullification should never be allowed when a violent 
crime is involved.  Some nullification will occur in other types of cases, 
but no jury instruction regarding nullification should be given.  
Generally, he believes that jury nullification undermines our system of 
justice. 
 
James Ostrowski, The Rise and Fall of Jury Nullification, 15. J. of 
Libertar. St. 89 (2001): 
Ostrowski believes the United States is no longer a republic but has 
become a democracy.  As a result, jury nullification has evolved from a 
practice, to a right, to a power subject to no judicial review, to a power 
about which the court and lawyers may not inform jurors, to a practice 
which subjects jurors to punishment by the court.  He sees this evolution 
as taking our jury system back to medieval England. 
 
David A. Pepper, Nullifying History:  Modern-Day Misuse of the Right 
to Decide the Law, 50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 599 (2000): 
Pepper contends that pro-nullification scholars have misapplied the 
historical record in concluding that jurors have the “right,” as opposed to 
merely the power to nullify at will.  The modern proponents of the right 
to nullify will have to find another argument to support their position. 
 
Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, and 
Jury Nullification, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 467 (2001): 
Pettys discusses the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Old 
Chief v. United States that evidence offered by the government in a 
criminal case has “‘fair and legitimate weight’ if it tends to show that a 
guilty verdict would be morally reasonable.”  He argues that adopting 
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Old Chief’s conception of relevance makes necessary significant changes 
in the rules related to jury nullification, such as permitting the defense to 
offer evidence that a guilty verdict would be morally unreasonable, to 
argue jury nullification in closing argument, and to have a jury 
nullification instruction. 
 
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12 
(1910): 
Roscoe Pound believes “jury lawlessness” is one of the ways we 
attempt to adjust the letter of the law to the demands of administration 
in concrete cases while apparently preserving the law unaltered. 
 
Dianah L. Pressley, Jury Nullification:  The Inchoate Power, 20 Am. J. 
Trial Adv. 451 (1997): 
This article explains recent developments in the area of jury 
nullification. 
 
Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Judicial Conference of the District of 
Columbia Circuit, Williamsburg, Virginia, 145 F.R.D. 149 (1993): 
This publication documents the proceedings of a panel discussion at 
a judicial conference in which Federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein, defense 
attorney Ken Munch, and law professors Richard Uviller and Steve 
Saltzburg participated. 
 
John T. Reed, Comment, Penn, Zenger and O.J.:  Jury Nullification–
Justice or the “Wacko Fringe’s” Attempt to Further Its Anti-Government 
Agenda?, 34 Duq. L. Rev. 1125 (1996): 
This note discusses what jury nullification means, reviews its 
history, and discusses arguments against it.  The note argues that jury 
nullification should be allowed. 
 
Michael J. Saks, Judicial Nullification, 68 Ind. L.J. 1281 (1993): 
This symposium participant briefly discusses jury nullification in the 
context of the routine nullification of the law by judges who render it 
meaningless by giving bewildering instructions.  Comments on the irony 
of judicial opposition to jury nullification are given; specifically, if judges 
were really concerned with the jurors following the law, they would 
communicate the law to the jury so that the law could be understood. 
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Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification:  The Right to Say No, 45 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 168 (1972): 
Scheflin views jury nullification as an exercise of discretion in the 
administration of law and justice, which serves as a useful check on 
prosecutorial indiscretion.  He also sees jury nullification as critical to the 
stability of democracy. 
 
Alan W. Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification:  The Contours of a 
Controversy, Law and Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1980, at 51: 
Scheflin and Van Dyke review the historical development of the 
“acquit as a matter of conscience” theory of nullification.  They also 
examine recent judicial attitudes toward jury nullification and the 
lawmaking power of juries in other contexts, specifically, how jury 
nullification works in practice today in Indiana and Maryland, where 
juries are candidly instructed in their power to nullify.  Lastly, they 
examine the current arguments for and against nullification and 
conclude that jurors should be instructed that they have this important 
power. 
 
Robert F. Schopp, Verdicts of Conscience:  Nullification and Necessity as 
Jury Responses to Crimes of Conscience, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2039 (1996): 
In this article, Schopp takes an analytical and normative approach to 
examining the roles of jury nullification and the necessity defense within 
the criminal justice system.  Analytically, the article examines the role of 
jury nullification in response to crimes of conscience.  Normatively, it 
addresses the question of whether jury nullification is a legitimate 
component of the criminal justice system, and if so, how it may be 
distinguished from the defense of necessity. 
 
Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification:  An Historical Perspective on a 
Modern Debate, 91 W. Va. L. Rev. 389 (1988): 
Scott asserts that English law has never recognized the jury’s right to 
nullification on the basis of conscience; it existed in America only as a 
drastic reaction to an unrepresentative government.  The real motivation 
behind the nullification debate is to transform criminal prosecutions into 
vehicles for political change. 
 
Steve J. Shone, Lysander Spooner, Jury Nullification, and Magna Carta, 
22 Quinnipac L. Rev. 651 (2004): 
Shone is concerned with the current scholarly analysis of jury 
nullification, and argues that Lysander Spooner’s theory of jury 
nullification offers a more satisfying justification that is based on the 
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Magna Carta and the common law that the United States inherited from 
England.  In the article, Shone focuses on Spooner’s work, Trial By Jury, 
in which Spooner presented six theoretical arguments supporting jury 
nullification. 
 
Rita Simon, Jury Nullification, or Prejudice and Ignorance in the Marion 
Barry Trial, 20 J. Crim. Just. 261 (1992): 
This article examines the legal lore and social science data about 
jurors’ performance and considers the factors that allowed the jury to 
exonerate Mayor Marion Barry.  It questions whether the hung jury in 
the case was an example of “partial” jury nullification or an illustration 
of prejudice and ignorance winning out over facts and law. 
 
Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System:  A Skeptical 
View, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 488 (1976): 
This article examines the arguments in favor of the jury’s right to 
nullify and finds them wanting.  However, the article points out that this 
does not imply that changes in existing practices for the purposes of 
limiting a jury’s power to nullify are in order.  Instead, it demonstrates  
that any such attempts would have unacceptable repercussions on the 
system as a whole. 
 
Ralph Slovenko, Jury Nullification, 22 J. Psychol. & L.  165 (1994): 
Slovenko briefly surveys the history and philosophy of jury 
nullification in light of the acquittals of Dr. Jack Kevorkian. 
 
Robert J. Stolt, Note, Jury Nullification:  The Forgotten Right, 7 New 
Eng. L. Rev. 105 (1971): 
This note examines the history of jury nullification in the United 
States in the context of the Vietnam War and the Pentagon Papers case 
against Dr. Ellsberg. 
 
Simon Stern, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics:  
Debating Rationales for Jury Nullification After Bushell’s Case, 111 Yale L.J. 
1815 (2002): 
Stern believes previous discussions of Bushell’s Case have 
underestimated its impact on the jury nullification debate.  This note 
explores the process by which the defense of jury independence in 
Bushell’s Case was translated into a defense of jury nullification in the 
early 1680s.  Stern asserts that an historical understanding of the nature 
of jury nullification in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries must 
consider not only the language of the decision but also the debates that 
Conaway et al.: Jury Nullification:  A Selective, Annotated Bibliography
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
404 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
follow.  He concludes that there is a much stronger foundation for the 
law-finding right of the jury in the legal and rhetorical battles that 
Bushell’s Case engendered. 
 
Richard St. John, Note, License to Nullify:  The Democratic and 
Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 Yale L.J. 2563 
(1997): 
This note addresses the question of whether a jury could legitimately 
be given the right to nullify by legislative enactment or a state’s 
constitution.  The conclusion in the note is that the legitimacy problems 
inherent in jury nullification are too great to be cured by legislative 
enactment and that a jury’s power to nullify becomes more problematic 
when it is elevated to the status of a “right.” 
 
Robert S. Summers, Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judical 
Fact-Finding—Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases, 18 Law & 
Phil. 497 (1999): 
This article defines substantive truth as actual truth, while formal 
legal truth is whatever is found to be fact by either the judge or jury, 
regardless of whether it coincides with substantive truth.  The article 
explains that in a well-designed legal system, “substantive” and “formal 
legal” truth will usually coincide.  However, several factors may prevent 
the finder of fact from reaching the actual truth.  Among these factors is 
jury nullfication, which permits juries to refuse to “find” certain facts 
where they believe the underlying law to be unjust, even when the 
evidence clearly supports such a factual finding. 
 
Eleanor Tavris, The Law of an Unwritten Law:  A Common Sense View of 
Jury Nullification, 11 W. St. U. L. Rev. 97 (1983): 
Tavris believes theoretical arguments in support of jury nullification, 
centered around the issue of power versus right, fail to clearly resolve 
the issue.  Instead, pragmatic considerations might resolve the issue 
entirely.  Tavris addresses some of the “inescapable practicalities” of the 
issue, such as nullification abuse by bigoted jurors, the possibility of 
nullification convictions, and the burden on the jurors. 
 
Jon M. Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution, 16 Cath. Law. 224 
(1970): 
Van Dyke believes American jurors have become a docile and well-
regimented group.  He says justice would be better served if jurors were 
told that they have the power to act mercifully if they decide that 
applying the law to the defendant’s act would lead to an unjust act.  He 
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argues that the only justification for having juries is as an additional 
safeguard against government power. 
 
Steven M. Warshawsky, Note, Opposing Jury Nullification:  Law, 
Policy, and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 Geo. L.J. 119 (1996): 
This note argues that jury nullification should be discouraged by 
preventing criminal defendants from informing juries at trial of their 
nullification power.  The note highlights some legal strategies 
prosecutors can employ to prevent nullification during jury selection, 
pretrial motions, jury instructions, and closing arguments. 
 
Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification and Jury Control 
Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 825 (1990): 
Weinberg-Brodt believes any analysis of jury nullification using a 
“jury-centered framework” is seriously flawed.  The note explains that a 
jury-centered framework is one which fails to recognize that all “jury 
rights” are instruments to protect the defendant’s rights, stemming 
initially from the Sixth Amendment right to be tried by a jury.  
Weinberg-Brodt argues that the practical effect of this flawed framework 
is the imposition of prophylactic procedural rules that impact a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an independent jury.  Instead, 
Weinberg-Brodt proposes a “defendant-centered framework” that 
focuses on the defendant’s right to be tried by an independent jury.  
With respect to a jury nullification instruction, the author concludes that 
the “defendant-centered framework” would not necessarily require an 
instruction and may even permit an “anti-nullification” instruction 
under some circumstances. 
 
Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury ‘Nullification’:  When 
May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice?, 30 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
239 (1993): 
The author, a federal District Court judge, is concerned that distress 
about jury nullification reflects disturbing trends in society.  Nullification 
is a legitimate result of our constitutional process and government 
should not attempt to prevent it through strict controls.  However, he 
opposes instructing juries that they have the power to nullify, preferring 
that judges exercise their discretion to allow nullification by flexibly 
applying the concepts of relevancy and prejudice and by admitting 
evidence bearing on moral issues.  He proposes a model for the exercise 
of that discretion.  Jury nullification “arising from idealism is good for 
the American Soul.” 
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Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, The Many Dimensions of Jury 
Nullification, 81 Judicature 169 (1998): 
Weinstein believes jury nullification is not a serious problem.  He 
believes that jurors nullify to be fair—not out of disaffection—when 
society treats them properly.  Weinstein argues that the critical factor in 
avoiding nullification along ethnic and other structural schisms is to heal 
ourselves of the cancerous inequality of real opportunity and respect that 
pervades so much of our society. 
 
2. Offers Solutions 
 
David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited:  Why the Court Should 
Instruct the Jury of Its Nullification Right, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 89 (1995): 
This article argues that  courts have overstated the likelihood that 
fully informed juries will acquit and understated the harm produced by 
failing to inform jurors of their nullification power.  The article proposes 
a procedure for informing the jury, including a model instruction and a 
list of steps a trial court can take when it believes nullification may be an 
issue. 
 
M. Kristine Creagan, Note, Jury Nullification:  Assessing Recent 
Legislative Developments, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1101 (1993): 
This note analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of various legislative 
and constitutional proposals, including why they have all failed to be 
enacted.  It proposes language for legislation or a constitutional 
amendment that will encompass the benefits of the proposals but none of 
their drawbacks. 
 
David N. Dorfman & Chris K. Iijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness:  
Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 861 (1995): 
The authors believe that a jury nullification instruction would 
provide “a more rational basis for jury deliberation and decision 
making” and empower estranged communities.  The authors propose a 
specific jury nullification instruction and other adjustments to trial 
procedures that would solve current problems with the way juries 
exercise their nullification power. 
 
Robert T. Hall, Legal Toleration of Civil Disobedience, 81 Ethics 128 
(1971): 
This article considers four suggestions for the accommodation of 
civil disobedience by society, one of which is jury nullification.  The 
article argues that jury nullification is the best of the four suggestions, 
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but the legal machinery necessary for putting it into practice is lacking.  
Finally, it proposes a “Conscientious Disobedience” defense which, if 
raised, would permit a jury nullification instruction and argument. 
 
Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and 
Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 433 (1998): 
King assesses the constitutionality of the following two means of 
controlling nullification:  (1) excluding nullifiers from juries; and (2) 
restricting nullification advocacy outside the courtroom.  She concludes 
that these controls can withstand constitutional attack. 
 
Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 Va. L. Rev. 253 
(1996): 
This article proposes that legislatures establish a “nullification 
defense,” allowing juries in certain circumstances to acquit, despite 
evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but also authorizing certain 
“error-correcting procedures,” such as appeals from acquittals. 
 
R. Alex Morgan, Note, Jury Nullification Should Be Made a Routine Part 
of the Criminal Justice System, but It Won’t Be, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 1127 (1997): 
Morgan argues that nullification should be incorporated as a routine 
aspect of criminal jurisprudence by (1) allowing defense counsel to argue 
for nullification; (2) notifying the prosecution that a nullification strategy 
is contemplated, giving the prosecutor time to prepare an opposing 
argument; and (3) giving a jury instruction that the jurors should follow 
the judge’s instructions on the law unless finding the defendant guilty is 
repugnant to their sense of justice. 
 
Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury:  The Criminal Justice System’s Different 
Voice, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1377 (1994): 
Poulin fears we risk silencing the jury’s “different voice” when we 
restrict the evidence and refuse to inform the jury of its power to nullify.  
She, then, proposes the three following ways to adjust procedures to 
recognize the jury’s power to speak with a different voice:  (1) inform the 
jury that it is free to speak with a different voice and to act as the 
conscience of the community; (2) give the jury greater guidance on the 
law and facts; and (3) give greater care to the selection of jurors free from 
traits that risk tainting their decision. 
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3. Gender/Race & Jury Nullification 
 
Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman’s Syndrome Does Not Go Far 
Enough:  The Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 
141 (1995): 
Ayyildiz urges jury nullification for battered women who kill their 
abusers.  She believes juries should be informed of their nullification 
power, either through instruction or argument. 
 
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:  Black Power in the 
Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677 (1995): 
Butler urges black jurors to nullify some prosecutions of black 
defendants for non-violent crimes. 
 
Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice:  A Reply, 44 UCLA L. 
Rev. 143 (1996): 
This article refutes Professor Leipold’s reply to Bulter’s original 
article regarding jury nullification by black jurors.  The article asks 
whether the solution to the problem of racism in the criminal justice 
system can be color blind when the problem is not. 
 
Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary:  Using Violence and Subversion to 
Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 721 (2003): 
In this article, Butler evaluates the use of subversion and violence to 
change contemporary law perceived as discriminatory, when traditional 
methods are ineffective or too slow.  As an example of subversion, 
potential jurors could lie in voir dire about their concerns about racism in 
the criminal justice system to avoid being removed for cause.  They 
could then prevent a racist outcome by refusing to comply with the 
court’s instructions on the law.  But they should go a step further, too, 
and announce after the fact, that they have done so.  This risks 
prosecution for perjury but is a form of civil disobedience that could 
change the system.  The author analogizes this subversion to the fugitive 
slave law cases where jurors refused to convict, despite the facts, because 
the law was unjust. 
 
Clay S. Conrad, Scapegoating the Jury, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 7 
(1997): 
Conrad believes the conventional wisdom exaggerates the amount of 
racist nullification by jurors and exonerates the police, prosecutors, and 
judges who play as great or greater a role in exonerating lynch mobs and 
racists murderers.  He also examines cases involving racial violence 
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where juries appeared to nullify the law and argues that jury 
nullification played a minor role when one considers the party played by 
actors in the criminal trials. 
 
Long X. Do, Comment, Jury Nullification and Race-Conscious 
Reasonable Doubt:  Overlapping Reifications of Commonsense Justice and the 
Potential Voir Dire Mistake, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1843 (2000): 
This note examines the proposal to dismiss potential jurors who, 
during voir dire questioning, indicate a propensity to nullify.  The author 
stresses the fear that indirect questions asked by judges to elicit the 
venireman’s general opinions about racial bias in the criminal justice 
system will lead to dismissal for cause and undermine the role of the 
jury. 
 
Hihoshi Fukurai, Is the O.J. Simpson Verdict an Example of Jury 
Nullification?:  Jury Verdicts, Legal Concepts, and Jury Performance in a 
Racially Sensitive Criminal Case, 22 Intl. J. Comp. & Appl. Crim. Just. 185 
(1998): 
Fukurai examines the jury’s deliberative performance in racially 
sensitive criminal trials and concludes that in a highly publicized 
criminal trial involving a member of racial and ethnic minorities, 
minority jurors are more likely to adhere to the strict application of 
criminal legal standards in their deliberative process. 
 
Elissa Krauss & Martha Schulman, The Myth of Black Juror 
Nullification:  Racism Dressed Up in Jurisprudential Clothing, 7 Cornell J.L. & 
Pub. Pol`y 57 (1997): 
The authors in this article consider how the adherence of African-
American jurors to fundamental legal principles underlying jury 
decision-making has been wrongly characterized as a pattern of 
nullification that undermines the jury system.  They argue that the myth 
of black juror nullification is a racist attack on the jury system. 
 
Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification:  A 
Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 108 (1996): 
Leipold calls Butler’s position “understandable” but also “foolish 
and dangerous.”  He argues that the factual assumptions underlying 
Butler’s plan are wrong and that he misconstrues the lessons history 
teaches about jury nullification; Butler’s plan would fail on its own terms 
even if his assumptions were correct.  Leipold concludes that Butler’s 
plan would solidify and constitutionalize racism and leave African 
Americans as a group worse off. 
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Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims of Jury 
Nullification, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 285 (1999): 
In this article, Marder questions why the press sometimes 
characterizes a jury’s decision as a case of jury nullification when, in fact, 
the jury’s decision was based on reasonable doubt.  Marder concludes 
that false nullification claims occur when there is disagreement with the 
verdict and distrust of the jury that reached it.  She asserts that false 
claims are harmful as they perpetuate racial stereotypes, cast doubts on 
jury decisions and invite the government to step in and “fix” the 
problem.  To reduce the false claims of nullification, Marder argues that 
juries should be made as diverse as possible by eliminating efforts to 
skew jury composition and create homogeneous juries. 
 
John P. Relman, Overcoming Obstacles to Federal Fair Housing 
Enforcement in the South:  A Case Study in Jury Nullification, 61 Miss. L.J. 
579 (1991): 
This article examines the use of jury nullification in civil trials to 
reach patently unjust verdicts.  The article examines United States v. 
Schay, a fair housing case in which an all-white southern jury found for 
the white defendant against overwhelming evidence to the contrary.  It 
also discusses motions for new trials and motions for judgments not on 
the verdict as bulwarks against jury nullification.  Lastly, it suggests 
ways in which a new trial standard might be crafted to prevent such 
injustices without unduly interfering with the functions and province of 
the jury. 
 
Symposium, The Role of Race-Based Jury Nullification in American 
Criminal Justice, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 907 (1997): 
This citation provides the adaptation of a transcript of a program 
held April 7, 1996, at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago featuring 
Paul Butler, Andrew Leipold, and Judge Charles P. Kocoras with a 
foreword by Timothy P. O’Neill.  The symposium consists of the case-in-
chief by Butler, rebuttals by Leipold and Kocoras, and a surebuttal by 
Butler. 
 
4. Jury Nullification in Political & Policy-Making Contexts 
 
Steven E. Barkan, Jury Nullification in Political Trials, 31 Soc. Probs. 28 
(1983): 
Barkan believes that the refusal of many judges to give jury 
nullification instructions in trials of Vietnam War protestors helped 
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ensure convictions, which in turn frustrated antiwar goals and protected 
the government from many repercussions that acquittals or hung juries 
would have brought. 
 
Gary J. Jacobsohn, Citizen Participation in Policy Making:  The Role of 
the Jury, 39 J. Pol. 73 (1977): 
This article briefly discusses jury nullification in the context of 
policy-making.  Jurors engage in policy-making when they (1) refuse to 
convict because they object to the substance of the law or the severity of 
the punishment attached to it, and (2) serve as the voice of the 
“reasonable man.”  This article asks the following two questions 
regarding the jury as a policy-making institution:  (1) should policy be 
made by an institution lacking in accountability, and (2) is a public 
institution that is engaged in a policy-making role an appropriate forum 
for the ventilation of matters of conscience. 
 
William M. Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 71 (1970): 
Kuntsler argues that the jury is a “safety valve” that must exist.  
Juries must be informed that they are the consciences of their 
communities and free to acquit those who have broken the law in the 
context of the Catonsville Nine (Father Berrigan) case. 
 
Philip Lynch, Juries as Communities of Resistence:  Eureka and the Power 
of the Rabble, 27 Alternative L.J. 83 (2002): 
The author argues that jurors can, do, and should commit acts of 
“civil disobedience” when they believe the law is unjust or that exigent 
circumstances justify the defendant’s actions.  The author examines jury 
nullification in the context of the Eureka Stockade in 1854 and the trials 
and acquittals that followed. 
 
Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Drug Laws & Sentencing, 6 J. Gender Race & 
Just. 337 (2002): 
Marder sees the jury as a mechanism to provide feedback to the 
other branches of government before outrage over unpopular/unjust 
laws can become harmful.  She also argues that the passage of less harsh 
sentencing schemes in several states were in response to jury acquittals 
in drug cases.  Marder says these institutional responses to jury 
nullification are appropriate to democracy. 
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Joseph L. Sax, Conscience & Anarchy:  The Prosecution of War Resisters, 
57 Yale Rev. 481 (1968): 
This author sees jury nullification as useful because it it is a 
compromise between anarchy and despotism.  The article says that jury 
nullification allows the legal system to “accommodate itself to situations 
in which violations of the law should be viewed as justifiable.” 
 
5. Death Penalty 
 
Susie Cho, Comment, Capital Confusion:  The Effect of Jury Instructions 
on the Decision to Impose Death, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 532 (1994): 
This note discusses jury nullification in the context of death penalty 
cases, concluding that juries must confine their decisions within the 
given instructions.  Permitting jury nullification instructions in capital 
cases, the note argues, would “promote arbitrary decision-making in an 
area of law where . . . the defendant deserves ‘super due process’ rights.” 
 
Brian Galle, Note, Free Exercise Rights of Capital Jurors, 101 Colum. L. 
Rev. 569 (2001): 
This note discusses jury nullification in the context of “death 
qualification” in capital cases and suggests a revised formulation of the 
present standard, which provides more protection for the religious 
liberty of prospective jurors. 
 
Bruce McCall, Comment, Sentencing by Death Qualified Juries and the 
Right to Jury Nullification, 22 Harv. J. on Legis. 289 (1985): 
McCall argues that the use of death-qualified juries to determine the 
sentence in a capital case violates a defendant’s right to jury nullification. 
 
6. United States v. Thomas 
 
Frank A. Bacelli, Note, United States v. Thomas:  When the 
Preservation of Juror Secrecy During Deliberations Outweighs the Ability to 
Dismiss a Juror for Nullification, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 125 (1998): 
This note analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Thomas in light of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)’s purpose 
and concludes that the evidentiary standard used by the court was 
warranted to maintain jury secrecy. 
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David C. Brody, Balancing Jury Secrecy and the Rule of Law:  The Second 
Circuit’s Guide to Removing Nullifying Jurors, 20 Just. Sys. J. 113 (1998): 
Brody concludes that the opinion in United States v. Thomas is 
logically sound and on its face quite limited, but sets a dangerous 
precedent.  Brody argues that close scrutiny should be used. 
 
James H. Gold, Voir Dire:  Questioning Prospective Jurors on Their 
Willingness to Follow the Law, 60 Ind. L.J. 163 (1984-85): 
Written before United States v. Thomas, this article addresses whether 
prospective jurors should be questioned regarding their willingness to 
nullify.  This article finds that the reasons offered for prohibiting 
nullification questions during voir dire do not justify a blanket 
prohibition. 
 
Elizabeth I. Haynes, Note, United States v. Thomas:  Pulling the Jury 
Apart, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 731 (1998): 
Haynes sees jury nullification as a struggle between those who 
distrust the government (and thus advocate jury nullification) and those 
who distrust the masses (and thus oppose jury nullification).  Haynes 
explains that in United States v. Thomas, the Second Circuit tried to strike 
a compromise between the two, rejecting popular control but 
establishing a high evidentiary standard for the removal of nullifying 
jurors.  However, Haynes expects continued polarization.  
 
Patrick M. Pericak, Casenote, Using Rule 23(b) as a Means of 
Preventing Juror Nullification, United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d 
Cir. 1997), 23 S. Ill. U. L.J. 173 (1998): 
Pericak argues that the Second Circuit should not have established 
such a high standard to determine whether a juror intends to nullify.  He 
argues that federal courts should use Rule 23(b) to dismiss a juror if the 
court believes the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
juror intends to nullify. 
 
Ran Zev Schijanovich, Note, The Second Circuit’s Attack on Jury 
Nullification in United States v. Thomas:  In Disregard of the Law and the 
Evidence, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1275 (1999): 
In this note, the author argues that United States v. Thomas is the 
“most far-reaching action taken by the federal courts” to suppress jury 
nullification, an erroneous application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b), and a departure from precedent and the spirit of the jury’s role. 
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7. Civil Jury Nullification 
 
Steven M. Fernandes, Comment, Jury Nullification and Tort Reform in 
California:  Eviscerating the Power of the Civil Jury by Keeping Citizens 
Ignorant of the Law, 27 Sw. U. L. Rev. 99 (1997): 
Fernandes concludes that the California court—unable to eliminate 
the jury’s nullification power—is content to keep jurors ignorant of the 
law and eviscerate their power to nullify the law in civil cases.  He 
proposes the adoption of a model jury instruction to restore the right of 
the jury to reject the statutory ceiling. 
 
Noel Fidel, Preeminently a Political Institution:  The Right of Arizona 
Juries to Nullify the Law of Contributory Negligence, 23 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (1991): 
This article discusses the origins and evolving interpretation of the 
Arizona constitutional provision that makes contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk questions of facts left to the jury.  It considers the 
utility of jury nullification in the civil setting of negligence law and 
whether juries should retain this power after Arizona’s statutory 
adoption of comparative negligence in 1984. 
 
Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1601 (2001): 
Noah attempts to construct historical, structural, and normative 
claims that might support the recognition of a law-dispensing power for 
civil juries. 
 
Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 
2003 Wis. L. Rev. 1115 (2003): 
This article explains that understanding why and how jury 
nullification has become delegitimized helps explain what is currently 
happening in the punitive damages debate.  It states that a “nullificatory 
jury” is one that “acts outside of its normal role as a finder of established 
fact and instead plays a part in the construction of social policy.”  The 
article concludes that if the power to award punitive damages is taken 
from juries and given to judges or bureaucrats instead, that juries will 
continue to award “punitive damages” through higher compensatory 
awards, which would lead anti-jury activists to strengthen their call for 
the elimination of juries. 
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8. State Specific 
 
John F. Bodle, Note, Indiana Juries in Criminal Cases as Judges of Law 
Under Constitutional Relic, 24 Notre Dame L. Rev. 365 (1948): 
Bodle argues that jury nullification—pursuant to the Indiana 
Constitutional provision—is dangerous to the defendant and the public 
alike, and detrimental to the orderly administration of justice. 
 
Samuel K. Dennis, Maryland’s Antique Constitutional Thorn, 92 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 34 (1943): 
Dennis discusses the history and application of Maryland’s 
constitutional provision granting juries the power of nullification. 
 
Honorable Oliver A. Harker, The Illinois Juror in the Trial of Criminal 
Cases, 5 Ill. L. Rev. 468 (1911): 
Harker examines the history of the then Illinois constitutional 
provision making juries the judges of law and fact in criminal cases.  The 
author, a judge and law school dean, concludes that jury nullification is 
fraught with danger and liable to abuse. 
 
Deirdre A. Harris, Note, Jury Nullification in Historical Perspective:  
Massachusetts as a Case Study, 12 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 968 (1978): 
This note examines the extent of the jury’s right to determine the law 
in Massachusetts, and it concludes that the courts must preserve the 
jury’s power to nullify the law without informing juries that they have 
this power. 
 
Gary J. Jacobson, The Right to Disagree:  Judges, Juries, and the 
Administration of Criminal Justice in Maryland, 1976 Wash. U. L.Q. 571 
(1976): 
Jacobson examines jury nullification in context of the Maryland 
constitutional provision that grants juries the power to determine the 
law.  He concludes that the provision serves a useful, if not critical, 
purpose in the administration of criminal justice in Maryland and should 
be retained. 
 
Mike Reck, Note, A Community with No Conscience:  The Further 
Reduction of a Jury’s Right to Nullify in People v. Sanchez, 21 Whittier L. 
Rev. 285 (1999): 
This note explains a California Court of Appeals decision, which 
held that a trial judge may instruct a jury that it cannot nullify and may 
threaten to remove any juror who would nullify.  The author argues that 
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the court went too far by authorizing the removal of jurors who would 
nullify, because if the courts are allowed to rule on the thought processes 
used by jurors, then the right to trial by an impartial jury is under severe 
attack. 
 
Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the 19th  Century, 74 Yale L.J. 170 
(1964): 
This note examines the evolution in the way people conceived the 
purpose and competence of the jury and its role in the process of 
government.  It especially concentrates on the procedural changes 
underlying the change in Massachusetts. 
 
Honorable Robert D. Rucker, The Right to Ignore the Law:  
Constitutional Entitlement Versus Judicial Interpretation, 33 Val. U. L. Rev. 
449 (1999): 
Rucker explores the Indiana Constitutional Provision giving juries 
the right to determine the law and facts, which current judicial 
interpretations severely restrict.  He proposes an alternate interpretation 
that preserves to the jury a right likely intended by the framers.   
 
Carolyn White Spenglar, Note, The Jury’s Role Under the Indiana 
Constitution, 52 Ind. L.J. 793 (1977): 
This note examines the history of nullification in Indiana where the 
state constitution provides that the jury has the right to determine law as 
well as facts.  It proposes a model for implementation of the 
constitutional provision in an orderly manner with initiative and 
creativity. 
 
9. The Fully Informed Jury Association (“FIJA”) 
 
Robert C. Black, FIJA:  Monkeywrenching the Justice System?, 66 UMKC 
L. Rev. 11 (1997): 
Black examines the Fully Informed Jury Association movement and 
suggests what effect its success might have on the criminal trial process.  
Black concludes that giving of jury nullification instruction would not be 
the beginning of anarchy, but rather, would authorize juries to take the 
purposes of laws and punishment into account. 
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Erick J. Haynie, Populism, Free Speech, and the Rule of Law:  The “Fully 
Informed” Jury Movement and Its Implications, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
343 (1997): 
Haynie discusses the challenge FIJA poses to the impartial 
administration of criminal justice.  He examines the nature and scope of 
FIJA advocacy, considers the dangers it poses to due process, and 
discusses possible remedies, suggesting that current limits on FIJA’s 
lobbying may not be enough to stop it from reaching its goal. 
 
Honorable Frederick B. Rodgers, The Jury in Revolt?:  A “Heads Up” 
on the Fully Informed Jury Association Coming Soon to a Courthouse in Your 
Area, Judges’ J., Summer 1996, at 10-12: 
A state judge warns against the activities of FIJA.  Rodgers 
recommends voir dire commentary that includes a threat of prosecution 
for perjury for violating the jury oath. 
 
Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries:  The Resilience of 
Jury Nullification (Protest and Resistance:  Civil Disobedience in the 1990s), 48 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 165 (1991): 
This article examines the grass roots movement to inform juries of 
their nullification power, analyzes some recent court decisions, and 
reports some of the recent significant developments related to 
nullification.  It concludes that the judicial system would be better served 
if judges instructed jurors of their true powers. 
 
10. Dissertations, Theses, & Jury Studies 
 
Frank A. Bacelli, The Mad-Hatter Tea Party:  How the American 
Criminal Justice System Has Turned the Jury’s Function on Its Head (2001) 
(unpublished master’s thesis, on file with Regent University): 
Bacelli believes the legitimate justification for jury nullification—to 
provide public checks on oppressive government action—still exists 
today.  He proposes changing the definition of the debate from the 
perjorative term, “jury nullification,” to one that reflects the true nature 
of the tradition, such as “jury conscientiousness” or “moral 
discernment.” 
 
Mary B. Beganyi, Moral Authority of Juries:  A Forgotten Aspect of 
Citizenship (1995) (unpublished master’s thesis, on file with the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas): 
Beganyi examines the ethical and historical foundations for a “Fully 
Informed Jury Amendment.”  She focuses on the dual role of the jury 
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deliberation process paralleling the distinction between natural law and 
legalism.  She also advocates for legal protection of the jury’s right to 
nullify. 
 
David Charles Brody, The Interaction of Jury Nullification and Abortion 
Attitudes:  Measuring the Effects of a Nullification Instruction on Juror 
Behavior Using the Trail Simulation Paradigm (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, on file with the State University of New York at Albany): 
The author found that whether jurors received a jury nullification 
instruction had a direct effect on several variables and was strongly 
associated with a finding of guilt in a scenario involving a clearly 
innocent defendant. 
 
David C. Brody & Craig Rivera, Examining the Dougherty “All-
Knowing Assumption”:  Do Jurors Know About Their Jury Nullification 
Power?, 33 Crim. L. Bull. 151 (1997): 
The authors of this article test the assumption of United States v. 
Dougherty that jurors do not need to be instructed about jury nullification 
because they already know about their nullification powers.  Two 
telephone surveys showed that a vast majority of individuals did not 
have an accurate knowledge of jury nullification. 
 
John Clark, The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification, 24 Law & 
Psychol. Rev. 39 (2000): 
Clark concludes that the social psychology of each juror, not the 
merits of the case, may ultimately determine the verdict. 
 
John Patrick Davis, When Jurors Ignore the Law and the Evidence to Do 
Justice (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with the University 
of Washington): 
In this dissertation, Davis explains how he found that jurors who 
received a nullification instruction acquitted a defendant more often in 
an ambiguous murder case but not in a sympathy-inducing euthanasia 
case. 
 
Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work?  A 
Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1249 (2003): 
This article reports the research findings of a National Center for 
State Courts study related to jury nullification and discusses the policy 
implications of those findings for the criminal justice community.  The 
article also identifies the difficulty identifying instances of nullification 
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and concludes that juror concerns about legal fairness and outcome 
fairness are present to some extent in hung and acquittal juries, but they 
are not the only factors that lead these juries to be hung or to acquit.  It 
also concludes that the presence of so many variables makes it unlikely 
that jury nullification plays a dominant role in the majority of cases. 
 
Erick L. Hill & Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Nullification Instructions and Juror 
Guilt Ratings:  An Examination of Modern Racism, 16 Contemp. Soc. Psychol. 
6 (1992): 
The authors of this article found that subjects tended to lessen the 
values of their guilt ratings for the white defendant, as compared to the 
black defendant, when they had received no instruction or a strong 
nullification instruction. 
 
Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instruction on 
Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 Law & Hum. Behav. 25 
(1985): 
Horowitz concluded that juries that received nullification 
instructions spent less time deliberating the evidence and more on 
defendant characteristics, attributions, and personal experiences. 
 
Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification:  The Impact of Judicial 
Instructions, Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 439 (1988): 
Horowitz found that juries are more likely to acquit a sympathetic 
defendant and to judge a dangerous defendant more harshly when they 
receive jury nullification information than when they do not or when 
challenges are made to nullification arguments. 
 
Irwin A. Horowitz, et al., Jury Nullification and Psychological 
Perspectives, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1207 (2001): 
This article raises a number of empirical questions relevant to the 
legal debate on nullification, reviews some of the empirical research 
bearing on these questions, and identifies questions needing further 
research. 
 
Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Willgins, Changing Views of Jury 
Power, 15 Law & Hum. Behav. 165 (1991): 
Horowitz and Willgins tracked the history of two views of trust in 
the jury system:  (1) Juries lack predictability and rationality and are 
moved by emotional concerns; (2) juries reflect an historical competence 
at applying common sense notions of equity and rationality to conflicted 
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and ambiguous cases.  They review the empirical research on the jury’s 
competence. 
 
Ilana Ariella Kaufman, Jury Nullification and Racism:  The Effect of 
Nullification Instructions and Racial Prejudice on Jurors’ Verdicts (1997) 
(unpublished master’s thesis, on file with the University of Windsor, 
Canada): 
Kaufman explains that results of a mock jury study repeatedly 
showed that radical nullification instructions produced responses that 
were nearly identical to presenting potential jurors with no instructions. 
 
Jeffrey Kerwin & David R. Shaffer, The Effects of Jury Dogmatism on 
Reactions to Jury Nullification Instructions, 17 Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
Bull. 140 (1991): 
In a jury simulation, dogmatic and nondogmatic juries were given 
either standard or nullification instructions by the judge after hearing a 
euthanasia trial.  The simulation showed that dogmatic jurors were more 
influenced by the judge’s instructions than the nondogmatic jurors. 
 
William Harold Moore, Effects of Nullification Instruction and 
Testimony Type on Mock Jurors’ Decisions (1992) (unpublished master’s 
thesis, on file with Carleton University, Canada): 
Moore studied the effects of nullification instructions on the verdicts 
of mock jurors in a simulated sexual assault trial.  Moore explains that 
the results showed that nullification instructions had no effect on the 
overall jury verdicts.  Manipulation of variables suggested that 
conflicting testimonies result in more not guilty verdicts. 
 
Christian A. Meissner, et al., Jury Nullification:  The Influence of Judicial 
Instruction on the Relationship Between Attitudes and Juridic Decision-
Making, 25 Basic & Applied Soc. Psychol. 243 (2003): 
These authors studied the effects of nullification instruction on mock 
jurors in cases involving non-physician-assisted euthanasia of varying 
facts.  The results indicate that the mock jurors were more likely to view 
the defendant as innocent (i.e., to nullify) when they held pro-euthanasia 
attitudes and the defendant used a mild form of euthanasia.  The results 
also show that participants given a standard jury instruction were 
influenced more by evidence and law, whereas those receiving 
nullification instructions were more likely to reply on their perceptions 
of the defendant’s action and their own attitudes toward euthanasia.  
The article discusses the implications of the study for the use of 
nullification instructions. 
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Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures & Making Law:  Juries and Their 
Verdicts, 13 Law & Soc’y Rev. 781 (1979): 
Myers analyzed data from a sample of jury trials.  She concluded 
that departures from rules were limited.  The results reflect a concern 
with the defendant per se, and also with his choice of victim and the 
seriousness of the prosecution’s charge against him.  Myers concluded 
that the jury role is neither clerklike nor discretionary.  Rather, rule 
departures occur only under certain circumstances. 
 
Kieth E. Niedermeier, et al., Informing Jurors of Their Nullification 
Power:  A Route to a Just Verdict or Judicial Chaos?, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 
331 (1999): 
This article describes four studies that examined juror biases and 
jury nullification instructions.  The results of the studies suggest that 
nullification instructions simply encourage jurors to nullify when the 
strict application of the law would result in an unjust verdict. 
 
Kristin L. Sommer, et al., When Juries Fail to Comply with the Law:  
Biased Evidence Processing in Individual and Group Decision Making, 27 
Personality & Soc. Psychol.  309 (2001): 
The authors of this article studied mock jurors to determine whether 
unfair negligence rules would bias their decision-making strategies 
individually and at the group level.  They found that noncompliant 
jurors biased their determinations of negligence to award damages when 
the decision criteria prohibited an award and when the decision criteria 
required an excessive award.  They also found that noncompliant juries 
were marked by the advent of a “trigger” person who raised justice 
concerns. 
 
Richard L. Wiener, et al., The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification:  
Predicting When Jurors Disobey the Law, 21 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1379 
(1991): 
The authors studied the assumption that juries obey the law as it is 
charged to them in the trial judge’s instructions.  They also concluded 
that comprehension alone cannot predict the likelihood that jurors will 
comply with the law. 
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Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury:  The Jury System and the Ideal of 
Democracy (1994): 
Abramson sees the jury as a deliberative body, one intended to make 
law.  He traces the decline of the deliberative ideal and the rise of 
distrust in juries.  He also argues for allowing juries to nullify the law 
and for instructing juries that they have this power.  Abramson believes 
the benefits of jury nullification outweigh its risks. 
 
Clay S. Conrad, Jury Nullification:  The Evolution of a Doctrine (1998): 
Conrad prefers the term “jury independence,” which is defined as 
when jurors in a criminal trial acquit because they believe conviction 
would be unjust.  Conrad discusses the history and modern day view of 
jury nullification, including the belief that nullification results in racist 
verdicts.  He also attempts to show that jury nullification is about citizen 
oversight of the legislature and of the criminal sanction.  Conrad believes 
jury nullification can “reduce social intolerance and divisiveness, reduce 
unnecessary incarceration, and redirect our criminal justice system to 
social protection, as opposed to social engineering.” 
 
William L. Dwyer, In the Hands of the People:  The Trial Jury’s Origins, 
Triumphs, Troubles, and Future in American Democracy (2001): 
Dwyer takes a popular (i.e., non-scholarly), anecdotal look at the jury 
system.  In chapter four (The Jury Breaks Free) Dwyer tells the story of 
William Penn’s trial and Bushell’s Case.  Chapter five (Juries and Liberty in 
the United States) tells the story of the Zenger trial. 
 
Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice:  Jurors’ Notions of the Law 
(1995): 
Finkel addresses the relationship between the law and 
“commonsense justice.”  He asks whether the law should follow the path 
laid by community sentiment or whether the community should follow 
the path the law has laid.  He discusses jury nullification and judicial 
nullification as symptoms of the law’s failure to produce commonsense 
justice.  Finkel concludes that only by listening to nullifying juries can we 
begin to understand the community’s sense of justice and fairness. 
 
Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience:  Perspectives on 
the English Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800 (1985): 
Green provides a social and intellectual history of jury nullification, 
highlighting the impact of nullification on procedural and substantive 
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law, the administration of law, and English perceptions regarding the 
role juries played in the criminal justice system.  Nullification was used 
to challenge laws proscribing certain behavior, to prevent excessive 
punishment, and to employ ad hoc sentencing that reflected the personal 
characteristics of defendants. 
 
Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, Discretion to Disobey:  A Study 
of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules (1973): 
The authors, a lawyer and a philosopher, discuss jury nullification in 
terms of the age-old dichotomy between conforming one’s behavior to 
the law and following one’s conscience by doing that which seems to be 
morally correct.  The law, they explain, “affects people’s decisions not 
only by threatening violators with sanctions, but also by offering people 
a framework for justifying their action.”  Clearly, however, the laws 
comprising the legal system are not absolute.  Discretion to Disobey 
explores the manner by which officials depart from the rules.  It then 
focuses on justified rule departures by members of the public.  It is this 
later section that is the most interesting, in that the authors suggest that 
jury nullification is not only sanctioned by the legal system but is in fact 
a viable part of the legal process. 
 
Godfrey D. Lehman, We the Jury:  The Impact of Jurors on Our Basic 
Freedoms (1997): 
Lehman offers twelve chapters, each illustrating a trial in which 
juries stood for individual rights against great pressure from the 
judiciary.  Lehman believes these trials demonstrate how “fully informed 
juries represent our greatest single defense of freedom and are the 
essence of [our] constitutional republican government.” 
 
Lysander Spooner, An Essay on the Trial by Jury (Project Gutenberg 
1998) (1852), available at http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/ 
gutbook/lookup?num=1201:  
This essay, written by an eccentric lawyer/anarchist/pamphleteer, is 
often cited as the classic argument for the doctrine of jury nullification. 
 
Conaway et al.: Jury Nullification:  A Selective, Annotated Bibliography
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
424 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
III.  PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
A. Judicial Cases & Decisions 
 
1. Historically Significant Cases 
 
Bushell’s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670): 
This is the case that started it all.  When an English jury acquitted 
Quakers William Penn and William Mead against the evidence, the 
judge issued a fine against each juror for contravening his orders.  
Bushell refused to pay the fines and was imprisoned.  In this historic 
decision, Chief Justice Vaughan ruled that jurors cannot be fined or 
imprisoned for their verdicts. 
 
The Trial of John Peter Zenger, at http://www.law.umkc.edu/ 
faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/zenger.html: 
In this famous 1735 trial pitting free speech against the law of 
seditious libel, a colonial jury found the defendant “not guilty” in direct 
contradiction with the facts and applicable law. 
 
United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 
14,545): 
Justice Story began the erosion of the jury’s right to decide the law as 
well as the facts in this early case involving the transportation of slaves.  
Sitting as a trial judge, Justice Story instructed the jury that although it 
had the physical power to disregard the law as given them by the court, 
they did not have the moral right to do so. 
 
2. United States Supreme Court 
 
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895): 
The Court held that in criminal cases the jury has the duty to apply 
the law as given to it by the court to the evidence in the case.  The Court 
also held that counsel had no right to dispute the law as the court 
instructed it. 
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United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972): 
The court in Dougherty found that there is no right to a jury 
instruction on nullification.  The doctrine historically was associated 
with questions of important moral values, such as seditious libel or the 
fugitive slave cases.  Juries have a tendency to ignore the judge’s 
instructions when the defendant’s position is one with which the jury 
could empathize, or where the jurors felt the defendant’s conduct was 
generally consistent with social standards, even though it might be 
technically criminal.  An instruction on jury nullification would 




United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969): 
The court held that the use of special findings in a jury verdict form 
constitutes reversible error as it has the potential for interfering with the 
jury’s traditional role in criminal cases.  The court reasoned that the jury 
must be free from both control and pressure from the judge in reaching 
its verdict.  The court concluded that a jury represents “the conscience of 
the community” and, therefore, must be permitted to consider more than 
logic when reaching its decisions, especially where the question of free 




United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997): 
The court held that jury nullification constitutes a violation of the 
juror’s oath to apply the law as the court instructs.  The court also held 
that courts must not permit nullification to occur when they have the 
power to prevent it.  Therefore, a juror who intends to nullify the law is 
subject to dismissal.  While nullification may sometimes succeed because 
jurors cannot be held liable for their actions in nullifying after they reach 
a verdict, the court held that a judge has a duty to take appropriate 
action where he or she becomes aware that a juror intends to violate the 
oath to follow the law.  The fact that the juror’s motive for nullifying is 
based on racial or ethnic considerations does not alter this rule.  Such a 
juror may be dismissed during deliberations. 
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United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1982): 
The Third Circuit held that absent a defense objection at trial, the use 
of special interrogatories in a simple criminal case did not constitute 
plain error.  The court noted that the disapproval accorded special 
interrogatories in criminal cases stemmed in part from the jury’s historic 
power to acquit in spite of the law and the evidence.  Courts have denied 




United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969): 
The Fourth Circuit held that juries will have the power to acquit 
despite the law and the facts as long as the courts adhere to a general 
verdict in criminal cases.  Therefore, a jury may acquit a defendant if it 
feels that the law under which he is accused is unjust.  However, the 




Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1981): 
The court concluded that the almost universal position of courts is 
that a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction advising the jury of 
its power to nullify. 
 
United States v. Leach, 632 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1980): 
The Fifth Circuit ruled that the jury’s right to acquit for any reason, 





United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1983): 
The sixth circuit found that the trial court properly refused to 
instruct the jury that it could acquit the defendant if it had no sympathy 
for the position of the government.  The court held that although a jury 
has the power to ignore the law, it has a duty to apply the law and 
should be so instructed. 
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United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1988): 
The court noted that no federal court has permitted a jury instruction 
on nullification, and few permit counsel to mention it in arguing to the 
jury.  The court affirmed the trial judge’s advice to the jury, which was 
given in response to a question based on a reference made to 
nullification in defense counsel’s closing argument, that there was no 




United States v. Brown, 548 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1977): 
The Seventh Circuit held that there was no error in refusing to 
permit defense counsel to argue in closing that the jury was historically 
the conscience of the community, because such an argument would have 





United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1974): 
The Eighth Circuit held that the trial court correctly refused to give 
defendant’s requested instruction advising the jury that they had the 
right to disregard the evidence, and the court’s instructions and to acquit 
the defendant if they found his actions did not shock the conscience of 
the community.  The court affirmed the rule that defendants do not have 
the right to an instruction on jury nullification.  It noted that permitting 





United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972): 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the defendant’s position that 
justice would be better served by instructing jurors on their ability to 
nullify and opening the way for more “conscience verdicts.”  It found 
that the existing safeguards are adequate to permit jurors to reach 
verdicts of conscience without a jury nullification instruction. 
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United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1976): 
The Tenth Circuit determined that the defendant was not entitled to 
a jury instruction advising the jury that it could decide the law as well as 
the facts and that it was free to disregard the law.  It held that it is a well 
established rule that the jury should only apply the law to the facts as the 
law is given to it by the court. 
 
United States v. Sealander, 91 F.3d 160 (10th Cir. 1996) (unpublished 
disposition) (Nos. 95-6002, 95-6017, & 95-6018, 1996 WL 408368): 
The court objected to allowing the pro se defendant to advise the 
jury of his right to nullify and to urge them to judge both the law and the 
facts during his closing argument.  The court held that neither the judge 




United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102 (11th Cir. 1983): 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the jury has the power to render a 
verdict that does not comport with the evidence or the law.  However, 
counsel may not be permitted to encourage jurors to violate their oath by 
arguing jury nullification during closing argument. 
 
United States v. Funches, 135 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998): 
The court held that the defendant was not entitled to either an 
instruction on the jury’s power to nullify nor to argue jury nullification 
to the jury.  Therefore, the court found there was no error in the trial 
court’s refusal to admit irrelevant evidence for the sole purpose of 
encouraging jury nullification. 
 




Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995) (civil case): 
The dissent, which denied the request for rehearing, opined that it is 
regrettable that jury nullification is selectively permitted in civil cases.   
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Hartley v. State, 653 P.2d 1052 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982): 
The court held that the jury’s duty to decide a case based on the law 
and the evidence is unenforceable.  However, when the evidence does 
not support a lesser-included offense charge, a defendant is not entitled 
to such an instruction.  The court concluded that refusing to give such an 




Williams v. Thude, 934 P.2d 1349 (Ariz. 1997) (civil case): 
The Arizona Supreme Court found that jury nullification is 
permitted in a civil case involving comparative negligence.  The court 
held that both state statutes and the state constitution give a jury the 
right to determine the facts and to apply contributory negligence as a 




Jones v. City of Little Rock, 862 S.W.2d 273 (Ark. 1993): 
The Arkansas Supreme Court found that a refusal to instruct the jury 
that it had the power to judge both the law and the facts was proper.  
The court held that the jury is bound by the judge’s decision as to all 




People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209 (Cal. 2001): 
The Supreme Court of California held that a jury has the right to 
acquit a defendant against the weight of the evidence.  However, an 
individual juror has no right to disregard the law.  The court reasoned 
that the fact that a prosecutor is powerless to challenge a jury verdict 
does not decrease a juror’s obligation to follow the law as it is instructed.  
The California statute provides that the jury is to decide questions of fact, 
and the court is to decide questions of law.  Therefore, it was not error to 
discharge a juror based on his intent to nullify. 
 
Conaway et al.: Jury Nullification:  A Selective, Annotated Bibliography
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004




People v. Wilson, 972 P.2d 701 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998): 
The Colorado Court of Appeals found that jury nullification should 
be avoided.  It held that the prosecutor’s argument on rebuttal that the 
jury was not free to acquit the defendant against the evidence simply 
reminded the jurors that they were required to follow the court’s 
instructions and apply the evidence to the instructions to determine 




State v. DelValle, 736 A.2d 125 (Conn. 1999): 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the trial court’s  
language in the jury instruction on the presumption of innocence, stating 
that the jury “must keep in mind that this rule of law is made to protect 
the innocent and not the guilty,” did not constitute reversible error.  
However, the court noted that similar language had been disapproved in 
other cases.  The court recognized that although such a statement would 
serve the “legitimate purpose of deterring jury nullification,” use of more 




Simonsen v. State, No. 50,1987, 1988 WL 61567 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988): 
The court held that a refusal to admit evidence as to the defendant’s 
addiction was proper, because it was introduced only for the purpose of 
jury nullification. 
 
District of Columbia 
 
Reale v. United States, 573 A.2d 13 (D.C. 1990): 
The court held that the jury’s exercise of its power to nullify should 
not be encouraged.  Therefore, courts should not use a standardized jury 
instruction advising a jury that it “must find” a defendant not guilty if 
the government fails to prove every element of an offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but instructing the jury as to its duty when the 
government proves every element of an offense.  A more appropriate 
alternative advises the jury that if it found that the government had 
proven every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt it was 
required to find the defendant guilty. 
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Farina v. United States, 622 A.2d 50 (D.C. 1993): 
The court found that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury as to 
its ability to acquit the defendant even if the government proved all 
elements of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was correct.  The court held 
that the trial court correctly permitted the prosecution to advise the jury 
that it had a duty to decline the defense’s invitation to become a law 
unto themselves after the defense counsel hinted at the jury’s power to 




Harding v. State, 736 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999): 
The court determined that jury nullification cannot be argued by 
counsel during closing argument because jury nullification encourages 
jurors to ignore the jury instructions.  The court concluded that although 
a jury is entitled to render a verdict that does not comport with the 
evidence or the law, this practice amounts to a violation of jurors’ oath 
and should not be encouraged. 
 
Dougan v. State, 595 So. 2d 1 (Fla.  1992): 
The court held that a jury has the discretion to grant a “jury pardon” 
with regard to a defendant’s guilt.  However, where the jury is to decide 
whether a defendant is to receive the death penalty, it is an imperative 
that its discretion be limited to prevent arbitrary and capricious 
decisions.  Furthermore, a jury may not disregard the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances provided in the standard jury instruction and 
recommend life imprisonment, and the trial court did not err in 




Andrews v. State, 473 S.E.2d 247 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996): 
The court held that where the evidence proves that the defendant is 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury has a duty to convict.  
Therefore, a judge may refuse to give a nullification instruction to the 
jury.  The court explained that a trial judge may exercise discretion to 
preclude defense counsel from arguing nullification because such an 
apparent conflict with the jurors’ duty to convict upon sufficient 
evidence could potentially confuse them. 
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Bryant v. State, 296 S.E.2d 168  (Ga. Ct. App. 1982): 
The court held that the Georgia Constitution and statutes provide 
that the jury is the judge of both the law and the facts in criminal cases.  
However, the court recognized that the “jury nullification” concept has 
been modified by the courts.  The rule in Georgia now is that the court’s 
duty is to construe the law in a criminal case, while the jury’s role is to 
apply the facts to the law.  Older cases, which authorized the court to 
instruct the jury that it could decide that the law was different from the 
judge’s instructions, have been overruled.  However, a jury has the 
power to independently construe the law in acquitting the defendant.  
The court held that even though the defendant admitted every element 
needed to convict him, the trial court’s ruling that this testimony was 
equivalent to a guilty plea exceeded its authority, and it was reversible 




State v. Hatori, 990 P.2d 115 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999): 
The court held that the jury instructions that the jurors must follow 
the law “notwithstanding their personal opinions” correctly advised the 
jury that it had a duty to follow the law as given by the court; the jurors 
should avoid allowing their personal opinions about the law to influence 
their decisions.  The court concluded that the court’s instructions, as well 
as questions during voir dire in which jurors were asked if they could 





People v. Moore, 662 N.E.2d 1215 (Ill. 1996): 
The Supreme Court of Illinois found that a refusal to permit defense 
counsel to argue that the jury could refuse to impose the death penalty if 
it believed the death penalty statute to be unconstitutional was correct.  
The court held that jury nullification is only a power, not a right, and the 
defense, therefore, did not have the right to argue nullification to the 
jury. 
 
People v. Douglas, 567 N.E.2d 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991): 
The court held that the defense is not entitled to a jury instruction on 
its power to nullify.  Therefore, the trial judge’s response to a question 
from the jury, which instructed it that it was to reach its verdict by 
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Beavers v. State, 141 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. 1957): 
The Supreme Court of Indiana held that the right conferred on the 
jury by the state constitution to determine the law in criminal cases is not 
an exclusive right but must be exercised with that of the court.  A jury 
must be instructed that the best source of the law is the court, and it must 
not lightly disregard its instructions.  However, the jury retains the 
power to determine the law in spite of such instructions when it renders 
its verdict. 
 
Denson v. State, 330 N.E.2d 734 (Ind. 1975): 
The court noted that Indiana is one of three states whose 
Constitution provides that the jury has the right to determine both the 
law and the facts in a criminal case.  This provision of the Constitution 
means that jurors have the duty to apply the law to the facts, and in 
order to do so they have to be the judge of the law and the facts.  
However, the jury must confine itself to the law of the State as defined 
by the legislature. 
 
Holden v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. 2003): 
The court held that the Indiana Constitution, in granting to juries in 
all criminal cases the right to determine the law and the facts, does not 
allow the jury the latitude to refuse to enforce the law’s harshness when 
justice so requires.  It ruled that a jury cannot ignore either the law or the 




State v. Hendrickson, 444 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1989): 
The Supreme Court of Iowa held that nullification “exalts the goal of 
particularized justice above the ideal of the rule of law.”  Therefore, the 
court found that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that its 
verdict must be based on the evidence and the law contained in the 
instructions.  However, the defendant had contended that this 
instruction deprived the jury of the right to nullification in that it can 
acquit a defendant even when the acquittal is contrary to the law or the 
evidence. 
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State v. McClanahan, 510 P.2d 153 (Kan. 1973): 
The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the rejection of an alternative 
pattern jury instruction that advised jurors that they were “entitled to act 
upon your conscientious feeling about what is a fair result in this case 
and acquit the defendant if you believe that justice requires such a 
result.”  The court held that although the jury has the “raw physical 
power to disregard the law,” its duty is to accept the law as pronounced 




Medley v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 190 (Ky. 1985): 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky found that the defense counsel had 
no right to advise the jury that it could find the defendant not guilty on a 
second offense if it believed his sentence on the principal conviction was 
enough to punish him.  The court determined that while a jury may 
always disbelieve the evidence and find the defendant not guilty, that 
right is not equivalent to a right to disregard the law.  Therefore, it was 
improper to instruct the jury on its power to nullify, and equally 




State v. Porter, 639 So. 2d 1137 (La. 1994): 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that jury nullification is a 
“recognized practice,” which allows a jury to disregard both evidence 
and the law as instructed by the court.  The court found that the concept 
of jury nullification may be compared to the “law of responsive verdicts” 
in Louisiana.  The court reasoned that even when the evidence clearly 
supports a conviction of a charged offense, a jury must be allowed to 




State v. Poulin, 277 A.2d 493 (Me. 1971): 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine refused to declare that juries 
are judges of law as well as fact.  The court noted that it “has long been 
the settled practice [in Maine] that the function of the jury is to find the 
facts and to apply the law as given by the Court.” 
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Stevenson v. State, 423 A.2d 558 (Md. 1980): 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Maryland 
Constitution makes the jury the judge of the law as well as the facts.  An 
amendment made in 1950 requires judges in criminal trials to instruct the 
jury as to the law.  Under the constitution, the jury is the final arbiter of 
the “law of the crime.”  The law of the crime refers only to the court’s 
interpretation of a criminal statute and the legal effect of evidence.  
Instructions by the judge on these issues are advisory only.  However, in 
all other areas of the law, the jury is bound by the judge’s instructions. 
 
Montgomery v. State, 437 A.2d 654 (Md. 1981): 
The court found that counsel is permitted to argue contrary to the 
court’s instructions regarding the law of the crime when there is a sound 
basis for a dispute as to the law.  However, counsel may not  attempt to 
persuade the jury to enact new law or repeal or ignore existing law.  The 
court held that where there is no dispute or a sound basis for a dispute 
as to the law of the crime, the court’s instructions are binding on both the 
jury and the attorneys. 
 
In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 539 A.2d 664 (Md. 1988): 
The court determined that the rule that the jury is the judge of the 
law as well as the facts has been eroded through judicial interpretation of 
the Maryland Constitution.  The court noted that the jury’s right to judge 




Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1993): 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that no jury 
instruction on jury nullification is required.  It held that although jurors’ 
verdicts sometimes do not comply with the instructions of the court, 
jurors have no right to nullify the law, and judges have no duty to 




People v. Bailey, 549 N.W.2d 325, amended by  551 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. 
1996), remanded to  554 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1996): 
The court explained that the power to acquit exists because the state 
may not appeal a jury’s acquittal.  The court reasoned that there is a 
Conaway et al.: Jury Nullification:  A Selective, Annotated Bibliography
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
436 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
distinction between the jury’s power to enter a verdict against the 
evidence to dispense mercy, and the right to do so.  The court held that 
the defense is not entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense 
when there is no evidence to support such an instruction. 
 
People v. Demers, 489 N.W.2d 173 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992): 
The court found that jury nullification is the power of the jury to 
dispense justice by returning a verdict that is not supported by the 
evidence.  The court held that although the jury has the power to 
disregard the court’s instructions, it does not have the right to do so.  
Therefore, a defendant is not entitled to present evidence at trial that 




State v. Perkins, 353 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1984): 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the jury has the power to 
grant lenity in a criminal case and enter a not guilty verdict in spite of 
both the facts and the law.  However, this power is not a right; rather, it 
is derived from the right of a jury trial, the prohibition against inquiring 
into the jury’s deliberations, and the lack of appellate review of not 
guilty verdicts.  The court found that the Minnesota Constitution does 




Davis v. State, 520 So. 2d 493 (Miss. 1988): 
The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the jury’s power to order 
an acquittal in a criminal case even when the evidence supports the 
defendant’s conviction is “an important part of the constitutional 
scheme” of the criminal law system.  However, there is virtually uniform 





State v. Hunter, 586 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1979): 
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that while jury nullification 
may occasionally occur, it is not encouraged by either the Missouri or 
federal courts.  The court noted that Missouri has no pattern jury 
instruction on nullification, and no Missouri case has sanctioned such an 
instruction.  Jury nullification usually occurs in cases involving issues of 
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conscience and morality, including the fugitive slave cases and cases 




State v. Pease, 740 P.2d 659 (Mont. 1987): 
The Supreme Court of Montana found that the trial court properly 
refused to instruct the jury that it could ignore the law and find the 
defendant not guilty even if he had violated the statute at issue.  The 
court concluded that the trial court’s refusal to allow the defendant’s jury 




State v. Green, 458 N.W.2d 472 (Neb. 1990), overruled on other grounds 
by, State v. Tingle, 477 N.W.2d 544 (Neb. 1991): 
The Nebraska Supreme Court found that a trial judge has the duty to 
instruct the jury on the law, and the jury must apply that law even if it 
decides that the law is incorrect.  The court reasoned that although a jury 
may acquit a defendant even when the verdict is contrary to both the law 
and the evidence, the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction about 
the power of jury nullification.  Therefore, the court held that the 
defendant did not have the right to instruct the jury that it has a right to 




Graham v. State, 992 P.2d 255 (Nev. 2000): 
The Nevada Supreme Court stated that “lenity” is not a separate 
basis for giving instructions on second degree murder.  The court held 
that the defendant’s position that he was entitled to the instruction 
absent any evidence supporting it was an attempt to legitimize lenity as 
a separate basis for a jury instruction.  Such a position is one of jury 




State v. Bonacorsi, 648 A.2d 469 (N.H. 1994): 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the jury has the 
power to acquit a defendant even where the acquittal is contrary to the 
law and evidence.  However, nullification is not a right of the defendant, 
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nor is it recognized as a defense.  Therefore, it is within the court’s 




State v. Ragland, 519 A.2d 1361 (N.J. 1986): 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the jury’s power to 
acquit despite its belief in the defendant’s guilt is simply a power that is 
undesirable.  The court stated that the defendant has no right to an 
instruction that advises the jury of its power to nullify and to act upon its 
“conscientious feeling about what is a fair result” even when the 
prosecution has proven its case.  The court concluded that nullification is 




State v. Clark, 990 P.2d 793 (N.M. 1999): 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the trial court properly 
rejected testimony regarding the death penalty from religious leaders 
and lawyers since the evidence was not relevant and it might have  




People v. Douglas, 680 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1998): 
The court recognized that the doctrine of jury nullification arose 
during a period when American jurisprudence was not fully developed.  
The court held that the trial judge properly instructed the jury that the 
question of whether the stop was lawful was a question of law for the 




State v. Lang, 264 S.E.2d 821 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980), rev’d on other 
grounds, 272 S.E.2d 123 (N.C. 1980): 
The court found “interesting, but without merit” the argument given 
by the defense that because a court may not advise a jury concerning its 
power of nullification, an instruction admonishing the jury that it had a 
duty to convict if they found that the State proved all the elements of the 
charges beyond a reasonable doubt was equally improper.  The court 
held that although a court may not order a jury to return a verdict of 
guilty, the instruction was consistent with the duty of the jury in a 
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State v. Tolley, 136 N.W. 784 (N.D. 1912): 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota discussed the state 
constitutional provision providing that “in all indictments or 
informations for libel the jury shall have the right to determine the law 
and the facts under the direction of the court as in other cases.”  The 
court found that this language was intended to vest in the jury the right 





No reported decisions found. 
 
State v. Jackson, No. 00AP-183, 2001 WL 138089 (Ohio Ct. App., 
February 20, 2001): 
The court found that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to 
instruct the jury on nullification.  Although a jury may ignore the law 
and the evidence in rendering its verdict, a trial court does not have a 
duty to advise the jury on its nullification power.  The court determined 
that such an instruction would imply approval of the doctrine of jury 
nullification. 
 
State v. Haywood, No. 78276, 2001 WL 664121 (Ohio Ct. App., June 7, 
2001): 
The court held that the trial court properly permitted the prosecution 
to argue against jury nullification, anticipating that the defense would 




Fauvre v. Roberts, 791 P.2d 128 (Or. 1990): 
The Supreme Court of Oregon held that jury nullification is “an 
acquittal in the face of evidence which would support a conviction, 
based upon the jurors’ assessment that the law under which the 
defendant is charged is unjust, the defendant is not blameworthy, or 
both.”  The court found that under the present state of the law, a jury has 
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the power, but not the right, to acquit a defendant when his or her guilt 




Commonwealth v. Feaser, 723 A.2d 197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999): 
The court found that the bar of double jeopardy prevented retrial of 
defendant on greater inclusive offenses after he had been found guilty of 
a lesser included offense.  The court recognized that of the three interests 
served by the double jeopardy principle, the most significant is the right 





State v. Champa, 494 A.2d 102 (R.I. 1985): 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that a jury has the power to 
reach a verdict in violation of the law, but such a verdict violates the 
jurors’ legal responsibility.  Therefore, a jury instruction on nullification 
would be improper, as it would lend the court’s approval to conduct that 
is lawless.  The court held that while a jury may not be sanctioned for 




State v. Vigna, 260 N.W.2d 506 (S.D. 1977): 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that where the trial judge 
instructed the jury “that they were the sole judges of all questions of fact 
and the credibility of the witnesses” in accordance with statute, failure 




State v. Taylor, 771 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. 1989): 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the giving of instructions 
which stated that a jury “should” find the defendant guilty if the 
evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the 
offense and that if it found from the evidence that the defendant was 
guilty it “will” report that fact in its verdict.  The court held that a trial 
court should not inform a jury in a criminal case that it can ignore the 
law in reaching its verdict. 
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Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996): 
The court held that a criminal defendant does not have the right to a 
jury that will nullify the court’s instructions as to the law.  While a jury 
has the power to ignore the instructions of the court, it is not expected to 
do so.  The court recognized that the Supreme Court has held that a trial 




State v. Findlay, 765 A.2d 483 (Vt. 2000): 
The Supreme Court of Vermont held that it was not error to refuse to 
instruct the jury that it had an “inherent right” to nullify.  The court 
further held that while jurors cannot be held accountable for their 
verdicts, they do not have a legal right to override the law and to 




Walls v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 384 (Va. Ct. App. 2002): 
The court held that while jury nullification occurs, a party is not 
entitled to encourage it.  The court reasoned that because a reduction in 
the minimum sentence would not be permitted during the penalty 
phase, the sole reason for allowing this argument would be to encourage 
an acquittal by the jury despite the evidence.  The court held that 
because there was no legitimate reason for the jury to be advised about 
the mandatory minimum sentence during the guilt phase, the trial court 




State v. Meggyesy, 958 P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998): 
The court held that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction 
regarding jury nullification.  The court found that there is no distinction 
between the requested instruction, which stated that a jury “may” acquit, 
and an instruction on “jury nullification.”  The court concluded that a 
jury’s power to acquit despite the evidence does not require the court to 
instruct the jury as to that power. 
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State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995): 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that depriving 
the defendant of the benefit of a jury in a civil fraud case was 
inappropriate.  The court recognized that while jury nullification is “out 
of favor,” the jury, historically, had a right to determine both the law and 
the facts.  The court stated that although such an instruction would be 
improper today, the federal courts still retain an “abiding respect” for 
the jury’s power to nullify an oppressive law.  The court concluded that 
in a case where the judgment constituted a fine or shifting of losses 
among those who were equally guilty, “inquiry into the facts will clarify 




State v. Bjerkaas, 472 N.W.2d 615 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991):        
The court held that  the trial court did not err when it refused to 
allow defense counsel to argue “jury nullification” in the closing 
argument.  The court stated that there is a considerable difference 
between a jury’s power to nullify and a right to do so.  The court found 
that the nullification power arises out of the inability of the state to 
appeal from an acquittal, no matter how “lawless.”  However, the court 
concluded that the mere existence of the jury’s power does not mean it 





Henderson v. State, 976 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1999): 
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the jury’s power of 
nullification is not a criminal defendant’s right.  The court further held 
that the State’s interest in the jury’s application of the correct law to the 
facts can only be protected by a correct instruction to the jury regarding 
the law to be applied.  The court concluded that there could be 
significant harm to an accused if a jury is not instructed that it must 
follow the law. 
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B.  State Constitutional Provisions 
 
1. General Provisions 
 
Ga. Const. art. I, §1, para. 11(a): 
Ind. Const. art. VII, § 6. 
Md. Const. Decl. of Rights § 23. 
 
2. Provisions Applying Only to Libel   
 
The following provisions state that in cases of libel, juries shall 
decide law and fact.  Some of the provisions include language, such as 
“as in other cases,” which suggests that juries also decide law and fact in 
other types of cases. 
 
Colo. Const. art II, §10. 
Del. Const. art I, § 5 (“as in other cases”). 
Ky. Const. § 9. 
Me. Const. art I, § 4. 
Mich. Const. art I, § 7. 
Mo. Const. art I, § 8. 
Mont. Const. art. II, § 7. 
N.J. Const. art. I, § 6. 
N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8. 
N. Dak. Const. art I, § 4 (“as in other cases”). 
Penn. Const. art I, § 7 (“as in other cases”). 
So.Dak. Const. art VI, § 5. 
Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 (“as in other cases”). 
Utah Const. art. I, § 16.  
Wisc. Const. art. I, § 3. 
Wyo. Const. art I, § 20. 
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